The meeting at Valverde de Leganes 14 May 1811
The meeting of Generals Beresford, Blake, Castanos and their staff at Valverde de Leganes on 14 May 1811 has barely been mentioned in many of the historical accounts of the Battle of Albuera; yet it was of historic importance, for it determined the sequence of events not only during the next few days but for the months ahead.
Some important dates:
09 March 1811 – Wellington orders Beresford south to attempt the relief of Badajoz under siege by Marshal Soult. With Beresford are the 2 nd and 4 th Divisions and Hamilton’s Portuguese Division, Collins’ Independent Portugues brigade, together with elements of the 13 th light dragoons, de Grey’s heavy cavalry and Otway’s Portuguese horse. He would later be joined from Lisbon by the 1 st and 2 nd light battalions of the King’s German Legion
11 March 1811 – Badajoz surrenders to Marshal Soult25 March 1811 – Beresford recaptures Campo Maior
15 April 1811 – Olivença surrenders to 4 th Division under General Cole
20-22 April 1811 – Wellington and Beresford at Albuera and reconnoitre Badajoz
08 May 1811 – Spanish generals agree to put their forces under Beresford. Arrangements for siege of Badajoz completed
09 May 1811 – Soult departs Sevilla on night of 9/10 Maywith force to raise allied siege of Badajoz
12-13 May 1811 – Beresford lifts siege of Badajoz
13 May 1811 -Beresford and Castanos to Valverde de Leganes
14 May 1811 – General Blake joins Beresford at Valverde de Leganes
15 May 1811 – Beresford assembles majority of Anglo-Portuguese force at Albuera. Soult’s army at Santa Marta with reconnaissance parties reaching out to Albuera
15-16 May 1811 – Blake arrives Albuera with 4 th Spanish army. Spanish artillery only arrives at Albuera 07.00 hours on 16 May. Cole arrives at Albuera from Badajoz with British 4 th Division early on 16 May16 May 1811 – Battle of Albuera 08.00 – 15.00 hours approximately
Background:
Wellington had sent Marshal William ‘Guilherme’ Beresford south on 9 March 1811 with part of the allied army with the intention of relieving the French siege of Badajoz. Almost as soon as Beresford left the Tejo, he had learnt of the surrender of Badajoz to the French on 11 March, and accordingly his mission became one of besieging the city, without the necessary equipment to do so. No sooner had the siege begun than Soult moved out of Seville with a force of some 24,000, forcing Beresford to lift the siege of Badajoz on 12 May so as to avoid being caught between the French in the city and Soult’s advancing force.
Wellington had envisaged that the French would attempt to retain Badajoz and while he had left Beresford to decide whether to fight a battle to maintain the siege or to retire back across the Guadiana into Portugal, he had directed Beresford to fight at Albuera if Beresford’s decision was to fight the French. For this purpose, Wellington had come south arriving at Elvas on 20 April. On the following days Wellington and Beresford conducted a reconnaissance at Badajoz and they had ridden over the land at Albuera. At this stage Beresford, having constructed a trestle bridge at Juromenha, had brought his forces across the Guadiana, captured Olivença (16 April), while occupying Albuera and Valverde (11 April). Beresford at this time had the assistance of perhaps 2500-3000 Spaniards under Captain General Francisco Xavier Castanos, which he used a screening force during the blockade and subsequent siege of Badajoz. Additionally, a slightly larger Spanish force of perhaps 3,500 under Ballasteros was to become available, while Captain-General Joachim Blake with the Fourth Spanish army of 8000 was expected to join Beresford having marched northwards from Ayamonte on the mouth of the Guadiana.
This was the first occasion in the Peninsular War that the forces of the three allies were to fight under one command, and it did not prove easy. However, the ground was set by Wellington with the help of Castanos. First of all Wellington instructed Beresford not to
begin the siege of Badajoz until all the Spanish commanders had agreed to Wellington’s plan of campaign. Secondly and most importantly Wellington determined that there should be one general in command in the event the allies gave battle. Wellington wanted Beresford to lead the allies. That was no foregone conclusion for Castanos was the senior general in the allied army, and the hero of Bailen in 1809 when an entire French corps under General Dupont had surrendered. Castanos however in an act of generosity readily agreed to serve under Beresford, suggesting that as the British composed the largest part of the allied force,
Beresford should command. While Beresford’s force including the Portuguese under his command did perhaps number 15,000, the Spanish were certainly the most homogenous in that with Blake’s force the Spanish numbered between 14 and 15,000. In that light must be seen Castanos’s generous conduct. Wellington referred to Castanos’s conduct as an
honourable act of self denial. (See footnote 2)
Beresford began the siege of Badajoz on 8 May. Two days later, Blake, then at Monasterio (some ninety-five kilometres north of Sevilla) learnt that Soult had left Sevilla that morning with a large force and was heading north in the direction of Badajoz. Other troops, including three brigades of cavalry, under Latour-Maubourg proceeded to join Soult. Blake began to move his army northwest to Fregenal de la Sierra and from thence to Barcarrota. When there was no doubt Soult intended to attempt the relief of Badajoz, Beresford, on hearing from Blake that the French were advancing at speed, lifted the siege on 12 May and moved south,
to link up with Blake’s army and prepare for a possible confrontation with the French.
Beresford ordered the 2 nd and Portuguese divisions to move to Valverde de Leganés, with a view to covering the various routes by which Soult might approach Badajoz. His light dragoons were sent to screen the French advance and to give warning of their arrival. He left Cole and the 4 th Division to dismantle the siege equipment and return it safely to Elvas, before rejoining the allied army. Beresford and his staff, together with Castanos reached Valverde de Leganés, some twenty-six kilometres from Badajoz, on 13 May. arriving there with Castanos on 13 May. At Number 7/9 Calle de las Torres in Valverde de Leganés, Beresford, Castanos and Ballasteros met up with Blake with whom he had been in frequent contact over the previous week. The conference there on 14 May clearly involved a considerable number of their respective staffs.
The discussion as to whether to fight the French at Albuera. [note La Albuera is 16 kms
from Valverde de Leganés]
1. There was some uncertainty as to the size of the force under Soult. Initially thought to be only 20,000, the allies now realized it was 24,000. While the allies (total 34,500) would enjoy a considerable numerical superiority if Cole, with the 4 th Division could join Beresford in time for the battle, it was clear that Soult would have a clear advantage in terms of cavalry. This was a serious factor in the open country of Estremadura.
2. Beresford seriously considered retreating across the Guadiana bearing in mind Wellington’s instructions which gave him leeway to do so, taking up a position on the River Caia (as Wellington had done after the battle of Talavera in 1809) or at Portalegre. To him the Spanish were a largely unknown quantity (See footnote 3). Further a retreat across the Guadiana by the
trestle bridge even with a Pont du tete was a risky venture, where if the bridge collapsed as it had already done once due to flood waters, the army might be trapped against the river and in any event might involve the loss of both his stores and the defensive ring enabling the main army to cross. Nevertheless, Beresford was not alone in considering a retreat, for José Jorge Loureiro, ADC to General Archibald Campbell, commander of the brigade composed of the Portuguese 4 th and 10 th line thought that Beresford would retreat to somewhere on the Guadiana where they could await further reinforcements (See footnote 4).
3. Abandoning Estremadura might open up the Alentejo to the French and even lead to a siege of Elvas, the only one of the four major border fortresses still in the hands of the Allies.
4. It was suggested later by Napier that senior officers in the 2 nd Division urged Beresford to stand and fight. Their wish it was suggested was particularly motivated by the fact they had not garnered laurels at Buçaco, having not been involved in the fighting there as they guarded Wellington’s right (southern) flank. However, Beresford’s Quartermaster General Benjamin d’Urban makes no reference to such alleged pressures in his diary; and one would have expected an issue of this sort to be the subject of comment. Later d’Urban specifically rejected this allegation.
5. On the other side of the coin, a successful battle would either destroy or seriously degrade Soult’s army of Andalucia, prevent the French resupplying Badajoz and enable Beresford to resume the siege of that fortress.
6. In reality however there is little room for doubt that the decision was massively influenced by Blake’s conduct at the conference. Part of the Fourth Spanish army which Blake commanded was then at Almendral, some twelve kilometres from Albuera; with
portions of it slightly further south at Salvatierra, Salvaleon and Barcarrota. Blake,who was a member of the Spanish Regency Council, indicated he could not take his army back south and that it would disintegrate if ordered to cross the Guadiana into Portugal. Blake insisted that if the Anglo-Portuguese force withdrew, he would stand and fight Soult himself. Even with Castanos and Ballasteros he was going to be seriously outnumbered and likely to be destroyed; as d’Urban put it ‘infallibly sacrificed.’ It is not known if Blake corresponded on the topic of the conference, but the English commentators leave us in no doubt as to the force
with which he put his case. While Beresford made the decision to deploy at and if necessary fight at Albuera, he remained plagued with doubts as to the wisdom of doing so, and made these concerns known to Wellington in letters written both before and after the battle, noting that Blake left him little option but to fight Soult at Albuera (See footnote 5).
Memorials
Today the important meeting at Valverde de Leganés is remembered by the erection of a memorial plaque on 7/9 Calle de Torres to commemorate a truly historic meeting with momentous consequences. The battle of Albuera on 16 May 1811 proved to be a sanguinary triumph for the Allies, preventing Soult from relieving Badajoz and enabling the Allies to resume the siege, before having to abandon it in mid-June in the face of a combination of French armies. Valverde de Leganés played an important part in the aftermath of the battle, treating the wounded and burying the dying, including Lieutenant Colonel Sir William Myers, commander of the fusilier brigade. Myers was severely wounded at Albuera, and died in the small town, where he and others in the allied army are remembered to this day by a memorial at the church.
Footnotes
1 Two good accounts of the battle of Albuera are Dempsey, Guy., Albuera 1811: The bloodiest battle of the Peninsular War (London 2008), and Thompson, Mark S., The Fatal Hill, The Allied Campaign under Beresford in Southern Spain in 1811 (2002). See also Beresford, Marcus de la Poer., Marshal William Carr Beresford ‘the ablest man I have yet seen in the army’ (2019).
2 Wellington to Castanos 13 May, 1811 (Wellington Dispatches 5,8); Wellington to Liverpool 22 May 1811(WD 5,37); Wellington to Wellesley 22 May 1811 (WD 5,30).
3 In the event, at the Battle of Albuera the Spanish division under General Zayas performed with particular heroism.
4 Loureiro, José Jorge (ADC to General Archibald Campbell, commander of brigade of 4 th & 10 th Portuguese line) to his father 20 May 1811; reprinted in Dempsey, Guy., Albuera Eyewitness, Contemporary Accounts of the Battle of Albuera, 16 May 1811(2023),147-8
5 Beresford to Wellington, 14 & 15 May 1811 (Wellington Supplementary Despatches, 7, 125-126).